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Non-signaling Approximations of Stochastic Team
Problems
Naci Saldi, Can Deha Karıksız, Maxim Raginsky, and Eric Chitambar
Abstract—In this paper, we consider non-signaling approxi-
mation of finite stochastic teams. We first introduce a hierarchy
of team decision rules that can be classified in an increasing
order as randomized policies, quantum-correlated policies, and
non-signaling policies. Then, we establish an approximation of
team-optimal policies for sequential teams via extendible non-
signaling policies. We prove that the distance between extendible
non-signaling policies and decentralized policies is small if the
extension is sufficiently large. Using this result, we establish a
linear programming (LP) approximation of sequential teams.
Finally, we state an open problem regarding computation of
optimal value of quantum-correlated policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Team decision theory has been introduced by Marschak [1]
to study decisions of agents that are acting collectively based
on their private information to optimize a common cost func-
tion. Radner [2] proved fundamental results for static teams
and in particular established connections between Nash equi-
librium and team-optimality. Witsenhausen’s seminal papers
[3]–[8] on characterization and classification of information
structures have been crucial in the progress of our understand-
ing of teams. In particular, the celebrated counterexample of
Witsenhausen [8] demonstrated the challenges that arise due
to a decentralized information structure in teams. We refer
the reader to [9] for a more comprehensive overview of team
decision theory and a detailed literature review.
In teams, due to its decentralized nature, establishing the
existence and structure of optimal policies is a challenging
problem. Existence of optimal policies for static teams and a
class of sequential dynamic teams has been shown recently
in [10]–[12]. More specific setups and nonexistence results
have been studied in [13], [8]. For a class of teams which
are convex, one can reduce the search space to a smaller
parametric class of policies (see [2], [14], [15], and for a
comprehensive review, see [9]).
In this paper, we consider extendible non-signaling ap-
proximation of finite teams. We first introduce three relaxed
versions of classical policies. These sets of policies can be
classified in increasing order as randomized policies, quantum-
correlated policies, and non-signaling policies. It is known
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that randomized policies do not improve optimal value of the
team, whereas quantum-correlated and non-signaling policies
in general improve optimal value. Moreover, the optimization
problems associated with non-signaling policies can be written
as a linear program and they can be solved in polynomial
time. After we introduce these classes of policies, we consider
extendible non-signaling approximation of teams by appending
auxiliary and identical agents to the team. We show that non-
signaling optimal value of the extended team converges to
optimal value of the original team at a rate depending on the
number of extra agents added. Since the non-signaling optimal
value of any team can be computed via a linear program whose
size is proportional to the cardinality of the observation and
action spaces, this gives a computable approximation to the
original team.
In the literature, relatively few results are available on
approximation of teams. We can only refer the reader to [16]
[17]–[22], and a few references therein. With the exception
of [20]–[23], these works study in general a specific setup
(Witsenhausen’s counterexample) and are mostly experimen-
tal, and as such, they do not rigorously prove the convergence
of approximate solutions.
In [20], [22], a class of static teams is studied, and the
existence of smooth optimal strategies is shown under quite
restrictive assumptions. By using this result, a rate of conver-
gence result for near optimal solutions is established, where
near-optimal policies are constructed as linear combinations
of basis functions with adjustable parameters. In [21], the
same authors considered an approximation of Witsenhausen’s
counterexample which does not satisfy the restrictive con-
ditions in [20] and [22]. An analogous error bound on the
accuracy of near-optimal solutions is derived for this problem.
In this result, both the error bound and the near optimal
solutions depend on the knowledge of the optimal strategy
for Witsenhausen’s counterexample, which is still unknown to
this date. Reference [23] showed that finite models obtained
through discretization of observation and action spaces con-
verge asymptotically to the true model in the sense that the
optimal policies obtained by solving such finite models lead to
cost values that converge to the optimal value of the original
model. In all these works, although one can construct nearly
optimal policies by solving a simpler problem for a large
class of teams, finding optimal solutions for simpler models
is shown to be NP-hard [24]. Therefore, these results do not
give computable approximations to the original team.
Contributions. (i) We introduce a hierarchy of policies for
teams: randomized policies, quantum-correlated policies, and
2non-signaling policies. The last two classes are almost new
to team decision theory and have not been studied much in
prior team decision theory literature. In these classes, non-
signaling policies are particularly important, as their optimal
value can be computed by solving a linear program as opposed
to the classical case. (ii) We establish extended non-signaling
approximation of teams by augmenting the team by auxiliary
and identical agents. We show that non-signaling optimal value
of the extended team converges to the optimal value of the
original team and quantify the rate. As the non-signaling opti-
mal value can be computed via linear program, this result gives
a computable approximation with an explicit error bound to the
original team problem. Therefore, this approach provides the
first rigorously established computable approximation result
with explicit error bounds for a general class of team problems.
(iii) Finally, we state an open problem on computation of
optimal value of quantum-correlated policies. A potential
solution of this problem is quite significant for team decision
theory, as it gives an admissible relaxation of classical team
problems in view of recent advances in quantum technology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we review the definition of Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model
for sequential team problems. In Section III we introduce,
respectively, randomized policies, quantum-correlated policies,
and non-signaling policies. In Section IV we discuss the ap-
proximation of randomized policies by extended non-signaling
policies. In Section V, linear programming approximation of
team problem is established. In Section VI we state the open
problem. Section VII concludes the paper.
Notation. Let E =
∏N
i=1 Ei be a finite product space. For each
j, k = 1, . . . , N with k < j, we denote E
(k:j)
=
∏j
i=k Ei. A
similar convention also applies to elements of these sets, which
will be denoted by bold lower-case letters and also to random
variables which takes their values on these sets. The notation
V ∼ ν means that the random variable V has distribution ν.
For any operator ρ on some Hilbert space, let Tr{ρ} and ‖ρ‖
denote its trace and operator norm, respectively. For Hilbert
spaces H1 and H2, let H1 ⊗H2 denote their tensor product.
For any real vector v, v  0 means that v is component-wise
non-negative. For any i, let Si denote the permutation group
of {1, . . . , i}. For random variables V,W , I(V : W ) denotes
the mutual information between V andW , andH(W ) denotes
the entropy of W . For probability measures µ and ν, µ ⊗ ν
denotes the product measure.
II. INTRINSIC MODEL FOR SEQUENTIAL TEAMS
Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model [4] for sequential team prob-
lems has the following components:{
X, µ,Ai,Qi, i = 1, . . . , N
}
where the finite sets X, Ai, and Qi (i = 1, . . . , N ) denote
the state space, the action space and the observation space
of Agent i, respectively. Here N is the number of available
actions, and each of these actions is supposed to be taken by
an individual agent (hence, an agent with perfect recall can
also be regarded as a separate decision maker every time it
acts). For each i, the observations and actions of Agent i are
denoted byQi andAi, respectively. The Qi-valued observation
variable for Agent i is given by
Qi ∼Wi(qi|x, a
(1:i−1)
),
whereWi is a conditional probability on Qi given X×A
(1:i−1)
.
A probability measure µ on X describes the uncertainty on the
state variable X .
A joint control strategy γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γN ), also called
policy, is an N -tuple of functions
γi : Qi → Ai, i = 1, . . . , N
such that Ai = γi(Qi). Let Γi denote the set of all admissible
policies for Agent i; that is, the set of all functions from Qi
to Ai and let Γ =
∏
k Γk.
Under this intrinsic model, a sequential team problem is
dynamic if the information Qi available to at least one agent i
is affected by the action of at least one other agent k 6= i. A
decentralized problem is static, if the information available at
every decision maker is only affected by state of the nature;
that is, no other decision maker can affect the information at
any given decision maker.
For any γ = (γ1, · · · , γN ), we let the (expected) cost of the
team problem be defined by
J(γ) := E [c(X,Q,A)] ,
for some cost function
c : X×
∏
i
Qi ×
∏
i
Ai → [0,∞),
where A := (A1, . . . , AN ) = γ(Q) and Q := (Q1, . . . , QN ).
Definition 1. For a given stochastic team problem, a policy
(strategy) γ∗ := (γ1∗, . . . , γN ∗) ∈ Γ is an optimal team
decision rule if
J(γ∗) = inf
γ∈Γ
J(γ) =: J∗.
The cost level J∗ achieved by this strategy is the optimal value
of the team.
In the literature, it is known that computing the value of
J∗ is NP-hard [24]. Therefore, it is of interest to find an
approximate optimal value with reduced complexity. To that
end, we establish a linear programming approximation of
team decision problems based on symmetric and non-signaling
extension of the original problem in Section V.
In what follows, the terms policy, measurement, and agent
are used synonymously with strategy, observation, and deci-
sion maker, respectively.
A. Static Reduction of Dynamic Team Problems
In this section, we review the equivalence between dynamic
teams and their static reduction (this is called the equivalent
model [5]). Consider a dynamic team setting where there areN
decision epochs, and Agent i observesQi ∼Wi(qi|x, a
(1:i−1)
),
and the decisions are generated as Ai = γi(Qi). The resulting
cost under a given team policy γ is
J(γ) = E[c(X,Q,A)].
3This dynamic team can be converted to a static team as
follows.
Note that, for a fixed choice of γ, the joint distribution of
(X,Q) is given by
µ(x)
N∏
i=1
Wi(qi|x, a
(1:i−1)
),
where a
(1:i−1)
=
(
γ1(q1), . . . , γi−1(qi−1)
)
. The cost function
J(γ) can then be written as
J(γ) =
∑
x,q
c(x,q, a)µ(x)
N∏
i=1
Wi(qi|x, a
(1:i−1)
)
=
∑
q
C(q, a)pi(q),
where
C(q, a) :=
∑
x
[
c(x,q, a)
N∏
i=1
|Qi| · Wi(qi|x, a
(1:i−1)
)
]
µ(x)
and
pi(q) :=
N∏
i=1
pii(qi) =
N∏
i=1
1
|Qi|
,
where pii is uniform distribution on Qi. Now, the observations
can be regarded as independent, and by incorporating the
Wi terms into c, we can obtain an equivalent static team
problem. Hence, the essential step is to appropriately change
the probability measure of observations and the cost function.
This method is discrete-time version of Girsanov change of
measure method. Indeed, a continuous-time generalization of
static reduction via Girsanov’s method has been presented by
Charalambous and Ahmed [25]. In the remainder of this paper,
we consider the static reduction of a dynamic team problem.
III. HIERARCHY OF POLICIES FOR TEAM PROBLEMS
In this section, we introduce three relaxed versions of team
decision policies Γ. These sets of policies can be classified in
increasing order as randomized policies, quantum-correlated
policies, and non-signaling policies. As we will see, random-
ized policies do not improve optimal value, whereas quantum-
correlated and non-signaling policies in general improve op-
timal value of the team. Moreover, the optimal value of non-
signaling policies is, for some classes of teams, strictly better
than the optimal value of quantum-correlated policies. More-
over, the optimization problem associated with non-signaling
policies can be cast as a linear program whose size scales with
the product of cardinalities of observation and action spaces.
A similar hierarchy of policies was introduced in [26] to
study games. In [26], advantage of quantum-correlated and
non-signaling equilibria over classical ones was discussed and
it was established that quantum-correlated and non-signaling
equilibria are socially more beneficial. Indeed, we have been
in part inspired by [26] to study the same classes of policies
for teams instead of games. However, our aim is not to show
benefits of quantum-correlated and non-signaling policies over
classical ones, instead we want to obtain an approximation
to the classical team problem by using these new classes of
policies.
In stochastic control, the joint distribution of state, observa-
tions, and actions for a given policy is called the strategic mea-
sure. In [27], a hierarchy of strategic measures for teams was
established, and many of their properties, such as convexity
and compactness, were shown. The strategic-measure version
of the set of non-signaling policies for team problems was also
introduced in [27], where it was also proved that the set of
strategic measures corresponding to the extreme points of non-
signaling policies is a strict superset of the set Γ of strategic
measures corresponding to deterministic policies. The main
motivation of [27] for introducing such a hierarchy to the set
of strategic measures is to establish the existence and structure
of optimal team policies, whereas we are mainly interested in
computable approximations of optimal team policies.
A. Randomized Policies
Note that one can consider any policy γ = (γ1, . . . , γN ) as
a conditional probability distribution on A given Q, where
A :=
N∏
i=1
Ai and Q :=
N∏
i=1
Qi.
Let P(A|Q) denote the set of all conditional probability
distributions on A given Q. Therefore, we can view any policy
as an element of P(A|Q). In view of this, we define the set of
randomized policies as the following subset of P(A|Q):
LHV :=
{
P ∈ P(A|Q) : P (a|q) =
∑
ω
N∏
i=1
γi(ai|qi, ω)λ(ω)
}
.
In this definition, λ(w) represents independent common ran-
domness shared among agents. In addition to common ran-
domness, agents can also randomly generate their actions
depending on the observation qi and common randomness ω.
Here, we use notation LHV to denote randomized policies in
order to make a connection with the ‘local hidden variable’
concept from quantum mechanics [28].
Note that LHV is a convex set whose extreme points are
deterministic product policies Γ. Since the cost function J is a
linear function on LHV, it takes its optimal value on extreme
points. Therefore, common and individual randomization of
policies does not improve the cost function; that is, optimal
strategy can be chosen deterministically. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we can indeed treat LHV as the set of
classical team policies. In this setting, the cost of the team
J : LHV→ [0,∞) can be written as
J(P ) =
∑
q,a
C(q, a)P (a|q)pi(q).
Therefore, we have
J∗ = inf
P∈LHV
J(P ).
Note that computing the value of J∗ is NP-hard [24], and, in
general, the optimization problem above cannot be solved in
polynomial time.
4B. Quantum-correlated Policies
To introduce quantum-correlated policies, we briefly intro-
duce the mathematical formalism necessary to discuss quan-
tum operations. We refer the reader to books [29], [30] for
basics of quantum information and computation.
For a finite-dimensional Hilbert space H, let D(H) denote
the set of positive semi-definite operators with unit trace. In
this paper, Hilbert spaces are assumed to be defined over
complex scalars. A state ρ of a quantum system, living in H, is
an element of D(H). A measurement on this quantum system
is given by a collection of positive semi-definite operators
{Ms, s ∈ S} such that their sum
∑
s∈SMs = Id is identity.
When one applies the measurement {Ms, s ∈ S} to the
quantum system with state ρ, the probability of obtaining the
outcome s ∈ S is given by
P(s | ρ) = Tr
{
Ms ρ
}
.
In quantum physics, a compound of N quantum systems
with the underlying Hilbert spaces {Hi, i = 1, . . . , N} is
represented by the tensor product H1 ⊗ H2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ HN of
the individual Hilbert spaces. Therefore, any state ρ (called
the compound state) of this compound quantum system is an
element of D(H1 ⊗H2 . . .⊗HN ).
With these definitions, we can now define quantum-
correlated policies. An element P (a|q) ∈ P(A|Q) is a
quantum-correlated policy if agents have access to a part
of a quantum compound state ρ ∈ D(H1 ⊗ H2 . . . ⊗ HN ),
where {Hi, i = 1, . . . , N} is a collection of arbitrary finite-
dimensional Hilbert spaces, and, for each i = 1, . . . , N ,
Agent i makes measurements {M qiai , ai ∈ Ai} on i
th part
of the state ρ depending on its observations qi to generate
its action ai as the output of the measurement; that is, the
conditional distribution P (a|q) is of the following form:
P (a|q) = Tr
{(
M q1a1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
qN
aN
)
ρ
}
.
Let QC denote the set of quantum-correlated policies in
P(A|Q). The following result states that randomized policies
are included in the set of quantum-correlated policies.
Lemma 1. We have LHV ⊂ QC.
Proof. Let P (a|q) ∈ LHV; that is,
P (a|q) =
∑
ω∈Ω
N∏
i=1
γi(ai|qi, ω)λ(ω).
Let H be a Hilbert space with dimension |Ω|. Fix some
orthonormal basis {eω, ω ∈ Ω} for H. We define
ρ =
∑
ω
λ(ω) ewe
∗
w ⊗ . . .⊗ ewe
∗
w
M qiai =
∑
ω
γi(ai|qi, ω) ewe
∗
w
for all qi ∈ Qi, ai ∈ Ai, and i = 1, . . . , N . Then, we have
P (a|q) = Tr
{(
M q1a1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
qN
aN
)
ρ
}
.
This completes the proof.
As opposed to the randomized case, it is known that
inf
P∈QC
J(P ) < J∗
for certain sequential team problems. One such team problem
is given below, which is called the XOR team [31]. For
this problem, we show that quantum-correlations improve the
optimal value of the team.
Note that [31], [32] give evidence that quantum-correlated
teams can be computationally tractable as opposed to their ran-
domized counterparts. Namely, in these papers, optimization
problems associated with quantum-correlated policies can be
written as (or can be approximated by) semi-definite programs
whose sizes scale with the cardinality of the observation and
action spaces. As a result, they can be solved exactly or
approximately in polynomial time. In particular, [31] computes
the optimal value of XOR team and [32] approximates the
optimal value of the unique teams via semi-definite programs.
However, there are other instances of team problems [33]–
[35], where exact or approximate computation of the optimal
value of quantum-correlated policies is NP-hard, and therefore,
cannot be cast as a semi-definite program. Therefore, it is an
interesting research direction to study approximation of the
optimal value of quantum-correlated policies via semi-definite
programs. Indeed, we will state this as an open problem in
Section VI.
Example 1 (XOR team). In XOR team, we have two agents
with binary action spaces {0, 1}. Observations are generated
independently and uniformly over some finite sets Q1, Q2.
Hence, there is no state variable in the problem, and so
the problem is automatically static. The reward1 function is
defined as
r(q1, q2, a1, a2) =
{
1, if a1 ⊕ a2 = h(q1, q2)
−1, otherwise,
where h : Q1 × Q2 → {0, 1} is some arbitrary binary-valued
function. This team problem with quantum-correlated policies
can be written as a semi-definite program due to Tsirelson’s
Theorem [30, Theorem 6.62]. Indeed, let us define
g(q1, q2) = pi(q1, q2) (−1)
h(q1,q2).
Given any ρ ∈ D(H1 ⊗ H2) for some finite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces H1,H2 and given any two collection of mea-
surements {M q1 , q1 ∈ Q1}, {M q2 , q2 ∈ Q2}, the correspond-
ing policy is
P (a1, a2|q1, q2) = Tr
{(
M q1a1 ⊗M
q2
a2
)
ρ
}
and its expected reward function can be written as
J(P ) =
∑
q1∈Q1,q2∈Q2
g(q1, q2) Tr
{
(M q10 −M
q1
1 )⊗ (M
q2
0 −M
q2
1 )ρ
}
.
Note that an operator H is Hermitian with ‖H‖ ≤ 1 if
and only if it can be written as H = M0 −M1, where Mi
(i = 0, 1) are positive semi-definite operators with ‖Mi‖ ≤ 1.
Therefore, for any pair (q1, q2), Hq1 = M
q1
0 − M
q1
1 and
Hq2 = M q20 − M
q2
1 are Hermitian with operator norms
1All results in this paper are also true for maximization of a reward function.
5less than 1. Conversely, for any pair (q1, q2), any Hermitian
operators Hq1 , Hq2 with operator norms less than 1 can be
decomposed as above.
Let X be a |Q1| × |Q2| real matrix. Tsirelson’s Theorem
states that the following assertions are equivalent:
1. There exist Hilbert spaces H1 and H2, a state ρ ∈
D(H1⊗H2), and two collections of Hermitian operators
{Hq1 , q1 ∈ Q1} and {H
q2 , q2 ∈ Q2}
whose operator norms are less than 1, and
X(q1, q2) = Tr{(H
q1 ⊗Hq2) ρ},
for all q1 ∈ Q1, q2 ∈ Q2.
2. There exists two collections {uq1 , q1 ∈ Q1}, {vq2 , q2 ∈
Q2} ⊂ R|Q1|×|Q2| of unit vectors such that
X(q1, q2) = u
T
q1
vq2
for all q1 ∈ Q1, q2 ∈ Q2.
Therefore, Tsirelson’s Theorem and the above fact about
Hermitian operators imply that
sup
P∈QC
J(P ) = sup
uq1 ,vq2∈R
|Q1|×|Q2|
q1∈Q1,q2∈Q2
∑
q1,q2∈{0,1}
g(q1, q2)u
T
q1
vq2 ,
subject to
uTq1uq1 = 1 and v
T
q2
vq2 = 1, for q1 ∈ Q1, q2 ∈ Q2.
This optimization problem is indeed a semi-definite program.
Therefore, the optimal value of the XOR team with quantum-
correlated policies can be computed in polynomial time as
opposed to its classical counterpart.
A special case for XOR team is the celebrated CHSH
(Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt) team [30]. In CHSH team, we
have binary observation and action spaces {0, 1} and the
reward function is defined as
r(q1, q2, a1, a2) =
{
1, if a1 ⊕ a2 = q1 · q2
−1, otherwise.
For this problem, the optimal value of randomized policies is
0.5 [30, Section 6.3.2]. However, quantum-correlated policies
can achieve the maximum reward of 0.707, that is obtained by
solving the corresponding semi-definite program. Therefore,
for CHSH team, we have
sup
P∈QC
J(P ) > J∗,
that is, quantum-correlated policies improve the optimal value
J∗ of the original team as opposed to randomized policies. 
C. Non-signaling Policies
A joint conditional distribution of actions given observations
is non-signaling if, for any i, the marginal distribution of
action of Agent i given its observation does not give any infor-
mation about the observations of other agents [36], [37]. Non-
signaling has been investigated in quantum mechanics due to
its close connection to foundations of quantum mechanics and
relativity [38]. Indeed, it describes the largest class of cor-
relations that obey relativistic causality (relativistic causality
dictates that it is impossible to communicate any information
faster than the speed of light). Using non-signaling policies,
it is possible to correlate actions of distant agents without
revealing their local information to other agents in the team.
However, to do that, agents should communicate their local
observations to a mediator, and then the mediator implements
a correlation without violating non-signaling constraint and
directs agents to apply certain actions. Therefore, to imple-
ment such policies, agents need to communicate with some
mediator, which is in general prohibitive in classical team
problems due to communication constraints. As a result, it
is in general not realistic to assume that agents can implement
non-signaling policies to design their strategies.
Note that, for randomized and quantum-correlated policies,
there is no need for a mediator to implement the strategies.
Therefore, quantum-correlated policies and randomized poli-
cies are indeed admissible in team decision theory. Moreover,
in contrast with randomized policies, quantum-correlated poli-
cies might improve the optimal value of the team and, for
certain cases, this improved optimal value can be computed
via a semi-definite program.
Formally, non-signaling policies are defined as follows. An
element P (a|q) ∈ P(A|Q) is a non-signaling policy if, for any
subset {k1, . . . , kM} of {1, . . . , N}, the actions of the agents
in {k1, . . . , kM} given their observations are independent of
observations of agents in {1, . . . , N} \ {k1, . . . , kM}; that is,
for any {k1, . . . , kM} ⊂ {1, . . . , N}, we have
P (ak1 , . . . , akM |q) = P (ak1 , . . . , akM | qk1 , . . . , qkM ). (1)
At first sight, it is tempting to claim that LHV is the same as
the set of non-signaling policies described by condition (1).
Indeed, in [39] it was first claimed that LHV is equivalent
to the set of all non-signaling policies, and a counterexample
was given to establish that the set of extreme points of non-
signaling policies is not Γ, which would imply that non-
signaling policies are more general than randomized ones as Γ
is the set of extreme points of LHV. It is evident that authors
of [39] were unaware of the quantum information literature,
where this result was known long ago.
It turns out that the non-signaling condition (1) can be
derived from fewer linear constraints, which will be described
below (see also [36, Section II-A]). These constraints indeed
enable us to write the optimization problem associated with
non-signaling policies as a linear program that scales with the
size of the observation and action spaces.
An element P (a|q) ∈ P(A|Q) is a non-signaling policy if
it satisfies the following condition:
(N) For each k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the marginal distribution of
actions excluding ak is independent of the observation
qk:∑
ak
P (a | q1, . . ., qk, . . . , qN )
=
∑
ak
P (a | q1, . . . , qˆk, . . . , qN ), (2)
for all values of a1, . . . , ak−1, ak+1, . . . , aN and
q1, . . . , qk−1, qk, qˆk, qk+1, . . . , qN .
6Note that each constraint (2) is linear in P (a|q) and the
number of such linear constraints is
N∏
k=1
|A1| · · · |Ak−1| · |Ak+1| · · · |AN | · |Q1| · · · |Qk|
2 · · · |QN |.
Therefore, if NS denotes the set of non-signaling policies
P (a|q) in P(A|Q), then the optimal value of the team with
non-signaling policies can be written as a linear program as
follows:
(NS) minimizeP∈R|A|×|Q|
∑
q,a
C(q, a)P (a|q)pi(q)
subject to P  0,
∑
a
P (a|q) = 1 ∀q
and P satisfies (N).
Thus, the optimal value of team with non-signaling policies
can be found in polynomial time. This is not possible for teams
with randomized policies [24] and also class of teams with
quantum-correlated policies [33]–[35].
The following result states that quantum-correlated policies
are included in the set of non-signaling policies.
Lemma 2. We have QC ⊂ NS.
Proof. Let P (a|q) ∈ QC; that is, agents have access to a
part of a compound quantum state ρ ∈ D(H1 ⊗ H2 ⊗ . . . ⊗
HN ), where {Hi, i = 1, . . . , N} is a collection of arbitrary
finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and, for each i = 1, . . . , N ,
Agent i makes measurements {M qiai , ai ∈ Ai} on the i
th part
of the state ρ depending on its observations qi to generate its
action as the output of the following measurement:
P (a|q) = Tr
{(
M q1a1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
qN
aN
)
ρ
}
.
We prove that P (a|q) satisfies the condition (N). Fix any
k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then, we have∑
ak
P (a | q1, . . . , qk, . . . , qN )
=
∑
ak
Tr
{(
M q1a1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
qk
ak
⊗ . . .⊗M qNaN
)
ρ
}
= Tr
{(∑
ak
M q1a1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
qk
ak
⊗ . . .⊗M qNaN
)
ρ
}
(a)
= Tr
{(
M q1a1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Id⊗ . . .⊗M
qN
aN
)
ρ
}
=
∑
ak
Tr
{(
M q1a1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
qˆk
ak
⊗ . . .⊗M qNaN
)
ρ
}
=
∑
ak
P (a | q1, . . . , qˆk, . . . , qN )
for all values of a1, . . . , ak−1, ak+1, . . . , aN and
q1, . . . , qk−1, qk, qˆk, qk+1, . . . , qN . Here, (a) follows from the
fact that
∑
ak
M qak = Id for any q ∈ Qk. Therefore, P (a|q)
satisfies the condition (N), and so, P (a|q) ∈ NS.
In the literature, it is known that
inf
P∈NS
J(P ) < inf
P∈QC
J(P ).
for certain sequential team problems. One such team problem
is the CHSH team which was introduced in Example 1 and
will be further discussed below. In this example, we will also
show the necessity of the communication between agents and
a mediator explicitly to achieve the maximum non-signaling
correlation.
Example 2 (CHSH team). Recall that CHSH team is a special
case for XOR team. In CHSH team, we have binary observa-
tion and action spaces {0, 1} and observations are generated
independently and uniformly. The reward function is defined
as
c(q1, q2, a1, a2) =
{
1, if a1 ⊕ a2 = q1 · q2
−1, otherwise.
For this problem, quantum-correlated policies can achieve the
maximum reward of 0.707 [30, Section 6.3.2]. However, non-
signaling policies can achieve the maximum reward of 1 using
the following policy, which is called Popescu-Rohrlich (PR)
box in the literature [38]:
P (a1, a2|q1, q2) =
{
1/2, if a1 ⊕ a2 = q1 · q2
0, otherwise
It is very easy to prove that P is non-signaling; that is, Ai is
independent of Qj for i, j = 0, 1 and i 6= j. The reward of P
is 1, which is the maximum achievable reward by any policy
as 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. Hence, P is the optimal non-signaling policy.
Therefore, for CHSH team, we have
sup
P∈NS
J(P ) > sup
P∈QC
J(P ),
that is, non-signaling policies improve the optimal value of
quantum-correlated policies.
Note that to implement the policy above, agents should
communicate their observations to a mediator, and then,
mediator directs them to apply either the same actions or
different actions based on the product of their observations.
This kind of communication is, in general, infeasible for
team decision problems. Therefore, although allowing non-
signaling correlations among actions of agents enables us to
formulate the team problem as a linear program (solvable in
a polynomial time), it is in general not realistic to assume
that agents can apply such policies in real-life applications
due to communication constraints dictated by decentralized
information structure. 
IV. APPROXIMATION OF RANDOMIZED POLICIES VIA
EXTENDIBLE NON-SIGNALING POLICIES
As we have explained in the previous section, non-signaling
policies are in general not feasible to apply in teams due to
intrinsic communication constraints in the problem. However,
if we add further properties to non-signaling policies such as
symmetric extendibility (defined below), then we prove that
such policies are almost equivalent to randomized policies,
and so can be used to approximately compute the optimal
value J∗ of randomized policies. Indeed, after we prove this
result, in Section V, we will establish a linear programming
approximation for computing J∗.
7To that end, we first give the definition of k-extendible
non-signaling policies. For any k = (k1, . . . , kN ),
where each ki is a positive integer, we define the set
of k-extendible non-signaling policies [28], denoted by
NSk ⊂ NS, as the set of all P (a|q) ∈ P(A|Q)
such that there exists a non-signaling k-extension P˜ ∈
P
(
(A1)
k1 × . . .× (AN )kN
∣∣(Q1)k1 × . . .× (QN )kN ) which is
permutation symmetric in actions and observations of each
agent; that is, for any i = 1, . . . , N and σi ∈ Si
P˜
(
(a1)σ1 , . . . , (aN )σN | (q1)σ1 , . . . , (qN )σN
)
= P˜ (a1, . . . , aN |q1, . . . ,qN ),
where ai ∈ (Ai)ki and qi ∈ (Qi)ki for i = 1, . . . , N , and
whose marginals are P (a|q); that is,
P˜
(
a
(j1)
1 , . . . , a
(jN )
N |q
(j1)
1 , . . . , q
(jN )
N
)
= P
(
a
(j1)
1 , . . . , a
(jN )
N |q
(j1)
1 , . . . , q
(jN )
N
)
,
for any ji = 1, . . . , ki and i = 1, . . . , N .
The theorem below states that randomized policies can be
approximated by k-extendible non-signaling policies if k is
sufficiently large. This result is the key to proving the linear
programming approximation of classical team problems.
Note that k-extendible non-signaling policies were first
introduced in [28] when N = 2 and k1 = 1. In [28], authors
proved the below theorem for this case. Hence, our result is
an extension of their result to arbitrary N and k. We note
that the technique used here to prove below result is very
similar to the proof of [28, Theorem 1]. However, there is a
crucial difference in the details between this problem and the
case N = 2. For the N = 2 case, the key step is to use the
chain rule for mutual information between actions and then
employ Pinsker inequality. When N is arbitrary, we should
use multipartite mutual information for which we have Pinsker
Inequality, but unfortunately, we do not have chain rule. This
indeed complicates the proof considerably.
Theorem 1. Let P ∈ NSk. Then, we have
min
R∈LHV
∑
q
‖P ( · |q)−R( · |q)‖1 pi(q) ≤
N−1∑
i=1
√
2 ln |Ai+1|
ki · · · k1
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A.
V. LP APPROXIMATION OF TEAMS
In this section, we show that the optimal value J∗ of the
classical team problem can be approximated within additive
error by a linear program. The key idea is to extend the original
team by adding extra identical agents to the team. Namely,
for Agent i, we add to the team ki − 1 more agents which
are identical to Agent i. Then, after we generate observations
(q1, . . . , qN ) from distribution pi of the original team problem,
the ith-observation qi is sent to one of the ki agents chosen
at random. We do not send any observations to the remaining
agents and we do not expect any actions from the remaining
agents. We name this situation as null observation and null
action, and denote them by the symbol null. Finally, we use
actions and observations of the chosen agents to compute the
cost function C(q, a).
It can be shown that the classical optimal value of the
extended team is the same as the classical optimal value of
the original team. Moreover, the non-signaling optimal value
of the extended team, which can be computed using a linear
program, is the same as the k-extendible non-signaling value
of the original team. With these observations, one can easily
obtain an approximation result using Theorem 1.
In the next section, we first give the precise mathematical
description of the extended game, and then prove the main
result of this paper.
A. Extended Team Problem
Fix any k = (k1, . . . , kN ), where ki is a positive integer
for all i. In k-extended team, we have k1 + · · · + kN agents
labelled by the pair (i, l), where i = 1, . . . , N and, given i,
l = 1, . . . , ki. For Agent (i, l), the observation space is Qi ∪
{null} and the action space is Ai ∪ {null}. The observations
are generated with respect to p˜i
(
q
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,q
(1:kN )
N
)
which is
defined as
p˜i
(
q
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,q
(1:kN )
N
)
=

pi
(
q
(l1)
1 ,...,q
(lN )
N
)
k1...kN
,
if q
(li)
i ∈ Qi ∀i,
rest is null.
0, otherwise.
Given observations
(
q
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,q
(1:kN )
N
)
and the correspond-
ing actions
(
a
(1:k1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:kN )
N
)
, the cost function C˜ is given
by
C˜
(
q
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,q
(1:kN )
N , a
(1:k1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:kN )
N
)
=
C
(
q
(l1)
1 , . . . , q
(lN )
N , a
(l1)
1 , . . . , a
(lN )
N
)
,
if q
(li)
i ∈ Qi ∀i,
rest is null.
0, otherwise.
Note that both p˜i and C˜ are symmetric in observations and
actions of identical agents; that is, for any i = 1, . . . , N and
σi ∈ Si, we have
C˜
(
(q
(1:k1)
1 )σ1 , . . . , (q
(1:kN )
N )σN , (a
(1:k1)
1 )σ1 , . . . , (a
(1:kN )
N )σN
)
= C˜(q
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,q
(1:kN )
N , a
(1:k1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:kN )
N ).
and
p˜i
(
(q
(1:k1)
1 )σ1 , . . . , (q
(1:kN )
N )σN
)
= p˜i(q
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,q
(1:kN )
N ).
The cost of the k-extended team J˜ under policy P˜ is given
by
J˜(P˜ ) =
∑
C˜
(
q
(1:k1)
1, . . . ,q
(1:kN )
N , a
(1:k1)
1, . . . , a
(1:kN )
N
)
P˜ (a
(1:k1)
1, . . . , a
(1:kN )
N |q
(1:k1)
1, . . . ,q
(1:kN )
N )pi(q
(1:k1)
1, . . . ,q
(1:kN )
N ).
Let N˜S denote the set of all non-signaling P˜ ∈
P
(
(A1)
k1 × . . .× (AN )kN
∣∣(Q1)k1 × . . .× (QN )kN ) and let
N˜Sk ⊂ N˜S be the set of k-extensions of the k-extendible
non-signaling policies P ∈ NSk of the original team.
Since both p˜i and C˜ are symmetric in observations and
actions of identical agents, any non-signaling policy P˜ can
be replaced without increasing the cost by some policy in
N˜Sk [28, Lemma 9]. It is also straightforward to prove that
8the optimal value of the extended team with randomized
policies is the same as the optimal value of the original team
with randomized policies. Moreover, the non-signaling optimal
value of the extended team is the same as the k-extendible
non-signaling value of the original team. These observations
imply that
min
P˜∈N˜S
J˜(P˜ ) = min
P˜∈N˜Sk
J˜(P˜ ) = min
P∈NSk
J(P ) (3)
and
min
P˜∈L˜HV
J˜(P˜ ) = min
P∈LHV
J(P ). (4)
Here, L˜HV denotes the set of randomized policies for k-
extended game. Note that the first optimization problem in eq.
(3) can be written as a linear program (see problem (NS) in
Section III-C) whose size scales with the product of cardinality
of observation and action spaces in k-extended team
N˜ := (|Q1| · |A1|)
k1 . . . (|QN | · |AN |)
kN ,
and so, can be solved in time polynomial in N˜ . Using (3) and
Theorem 1, we can now prove the main result of paper.
Theorem 2. There is a linear programming approximation,
whose size scales with polynomially (|Q1| · |A1|)k1 . . . (|QN | ·
|AN |)
kN , for computing J∗ to within additive error
ε =
N−1∑
i=1
√
‖C‖2 ln |Ai+1|
2ki · · · k1
,
where ‖C‖ = supq,aC(q, a).
Proof. Recall that J∗ = minP∈LHV J(P ) = minP˜∈L˜HV J˜(P˜ )
and min
P˜∈N˜S
J˜(P˜ ) = min
P˜∈N˜Sk
J˜(P˜ ) = minP∈NSk J(P ).
Therefore,
min
P∈LHV
J(P ) ≥ min
P∈NSk
J(P ).
Then, we have∣∣ min
P˜∈N˜S
J˜(P˜ )− min
P∈LHV
J(P )
∣∣ (5)
=
∣∣ min
P˜∈N˜Sk
J˜(P˜ )− min
P∈LHV
J(P )
∣∣
=
∣∣ min
P∈NSk
J(P )− min
P∈LHV
J(P )
∣∣
≤ sup
P∈NSk
min
R∈LHV
|J(P )− J(R)|
(a)
≤
‖C‖
2
sup
P∈NSk
min
R∈LHV
∑
q
∥∥P ( · |q) −R( · |q)∥∥
1
pi(q)
(b)
≤
N−1∑
i=1
√
‖C‖2 ln |Ai+1|
2ki · · · k1
,
where (a) follows from the fact that 0 ≤ C ≤ ‖C‖ and
(b) follows from Theorem 1. Since the optimization problem
min
P˜∈N˜S
J˜(P˜ ) can be written as a linear program whose size
scales with
(|Q1| · |A1|)
k1 . . . (|QN | · |AN |)
kN ,
this completes the proof.
VI. AN OPEN PROBLEM
In this section, we state an open problem on computation
of optimal value of quantum-correlated policies. As explained
in Section III-B, references [31], [32] give evidence that
quantum-correlated team problems can be computationally
tractable as opposed to classical case. In [31], the optimal
value of XOR team is computed by formulating the problem
as a semi-definite program (see also Example 1). Reference
[32] approximates the optimal value of the unique teams using
again semi-definite programs. As a result, these team problems
can be exactly or approximately solved in a polynomial time.
However, references [33]–[35] show that there are other in-
stances of teams for which exact or approximate computation
of the optimal value of quantum-correlated policies is NP-
hard, and therefore, these problems cannot be formulated as
semi-definite programs. One of the reasons for such negative
complexity results might be the fact that the optimal value
of quantum-correlated policies can be attained via quantum
systems living in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Indeed,
there are some evidences in the literature that supports this
observation (see, e.g., [40]). Therefore, in order to obtain a
computationally tractable problem, we may need to put a con-
straint on the dimensions of the Hilbert spaces where quantum
systems live in. To that end, let QC(d) ⊂ QC denote the set
of quantum-correlated policies where each agent has access to
a part of quantum compound state ρ ∈ D(H1⊗H2 . . .⊗HN )
with dim(Hi) ≤ d for all i. Then, we state the following open
problem:
(OP) Under what conditions on the components of the team{
X, µ, c,Ai,Qi, i = 1, . . . , N
}
,
there exists d ≥ 1 such that the optimization problem
inf
P∈QC(d)
J(P )
can be written or can be approximated by a semi-definite
program?
Note that one can prove, using the same argument in Lemma 1,
that
inf
P∈QC(1)
J(P ) ≤ J∗,
since there exists an optimal deterministic policy that achieves
J∗. Therefore, for any d, the team problem infP∈QC(d) J(P )
is indeed an admissible extension or relaxation of classical
team problem since it does not require any communication
between agents and a mediator. Hence, the solution of (OP)
will be a significant contribution to the team decision theory
as the optimal quantum-correlated policy can be realizable in
real life in view of recent advances in quantum technology.
One way to solve (OP) might be to use the so-called
NPA hierarchy [41], which provides an infinite hierarchy of
SDP outer approximations to the set of quantum correlations.
However, although it gives SDP outer approximations, there
are no bounds on the rate of convergence quantifying how the
approximation improves as the level in the hierarchy increases.
On the other hand, if we can bound the rate of convergence
for the NPA hierarchy, it will be possible to use it for solving
(OP).
9VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced randomized team policies,
quantum-correlated team policies, and non-signaling team
policies. The last two classes are indeed new to team decision
theory. We then develop an approximation of team-optimal
policies for sequential teams via extendible non-signaling
ones. We show that the difference between extendible non-
signaling policies and decentralized policies is small if the
extension is sufficiently large. Then, using this result, we
established a linear programming (LP) approximation of se-
quential dynamic team problems. Finally, we stated an open
problem regarding computation of optimal value of quantum-
correlated policies.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Fix any P ∈ NSk with the corresponding extension P˜ . Let
the observations be distributed independently(
Q
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,Q
(1:kN )
N
)
∼
k1∏
i=1
pi1 ⊗ . . .⊗
kN∏
i=1
piN
and actions be distributed with respect to P˜ :(
A
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,A
(1:kN )
N
)
∼ P˜
(
·
∣∣Q(1:k1)1 , . . . ,Q(1:kN )N ) .
For any i = 1, . . . , N − 1, we consider the following mutual
information
I
(
A
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,A
(1:ki)
i : A
(1:ki+1)
i+1
∣∣Q(1:k1)1 , . . . ,Q(1:ki+1)i+1 )
(a)
=
ki+1∑
li+1=1
ki∑
li=1
· · ·
k1∑
l1=1
I
(
A
(l1)
1 , . . . , A
(li)
i : A
(li+1)
i+1∣∣Q(1:l1)1 , . . . ,Q(1:li+1)i+1 ,A(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,A(1:li+1−1)i+1 ),
where (a) follows from chain rule and P˜ being non-signaling.
Now, we first find a lower-bound for each term in above
summation:
I
(
A
(l1)
1 , . . . , A
(li)
i : A
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣Q(1:l1)1 , . . . ,Q(1:li+1)i+1 ,A(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,A(1:li+1−1)i+1 )
= E
[
E
[
I
(
A
(l1)
1 , . . . , A
(li)
i : A
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣Q(1:l1−1)1 = q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,Q(1:li+1−1)i+1 = q(1:li+1−1)i+1 ,
Q
(l1)
1 , . . . , Q
(li+1)
i+1 ,A
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . ,A
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)∣∣∣∣Q(1:l1−1)1 = q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,Q(1:li+1−1)i+1 = q(1:li+1−1)i+1 ]].
Given any Q
(1:l1−1)
1 = q
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . ,Q
(1:li+1−1)
i+1 = q
(1:li+1−1)
i+1 , conditional
expectation in the term above can be bounded from below as
follows:∑
q
(l1)
1
· · ·
∑
q
(li+1)
i+1
pi1(q
(l1)
1 ) . . . pii+1(q
(li+1)
i+1 )
{ ∑
a
(1:l1−1)
1
· · ·
∑
a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
P˜
(
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
∣∣q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1−1)i+1 )
I
(
A
(l1)
1 , . . . , A
(li)
i : A
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣Q(1:l1)1= q(1:l1)1, . . . ,Q(1:li+1)i+1= q(1:li+1)i+1 ,
A
(1:l1−1)
1 = a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . ,A
(1:li+1−1)
i+1 = a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)}
(a)
≥
1
2
∑
q
(l1)
1
· · ·
∑
q
(li+1)
i+1
pi1(q
(l1)
1 ) . . . pii+1(q
(li+1)
i+1 )
{ ∑
a
(1:l1−1)
1
· · ·
∑
a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
P˜
(
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
∣∣q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1−1)i+1 )
(∑
a
(l1)
1
· · ·
∑
a
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣∣∣P˜ (a(l1)1, . . . , a(li+1)i+1 ∣∣q(1:l1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1)i+1 ,
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)
− P˜
(
a
(l1)
1, . . . , a
(li)
i
∣∣q(1:l1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1−1)i+1 ,
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)
⊗ P˜
(
a
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li−1)i ,q(1:li+1)i+1 ,
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)∣∣∣∣)2}
(b)
≥
1
2
∑
q
(l1)
1
· · ·
∑
q
(li+1)
i+1
pi1(q
(l1)
1 ) . . . pii+1(q
(li+1)
i+1 )
{ ∑
a
(1:l1−1)
1
· · ·
∑
a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
P˜
(
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
∣∣q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1−1)i+1 )
∑
a
(l1)
1
· · ·
∑
a
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣∣∣P˜ (a(l1)1, . . . , a(li+1)i+1 ∣∣q(1:l1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1)i+1 ,
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)
− P˜
(
a
(l1)
1, . . . , a
(li)
i
∣∣q(1:l1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1−1)i+1 ,
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)
⊗ P˜
(
a
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li−1)i ,q(1:li+1)i+1 ,
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)∣∣∣∣}2
(c)
≥
1
2
∑
q
(l1)
1
· · ·
∑
q
(li+1)
i+1
pi1(q
(l1)
1 ) . . . pii+1(q
(li+1)
i+1 )
{∑
a
(l1)
1
· · ·
∑
a
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣∣∣P˜ (a(l1)1, . . . , a(li+1)i+1 ∣∣q(l1)1, . . . , q(li+1)i+1 )−
∑
a
(1:l1−1)
1
· · ·
∑
a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
P˜
(
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
∣∣q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1−1)i+1 )
P˜
(
a
(l1)
1, . . . , a
(li)
i
∣∣q(1:l1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1−1)i+1 ,
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)
⊗ P˜
(
a
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li−1)i ,q(1:li+1)i+1 ,
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
)∣∣∣∣}2
(d)
≥
1
2
min
R∈LHV
[i:i+1]
P
∑
q1
· · ·
∑
qi+1
pi1(q1) . . . pii+1(qi+1)∥∥P (a1, . . . , ai+1∣∣q1, . . . , qi+1)−
10
R
(
a1, . . . , ai+1
∣∣q1, . . . , qi+1) ∥∥21,
where LHV
[i:i+1]
P denotes the set of all R ∈ P(A|Q) satisfying
R(a1, . . . , ai|q1, . . . , qi) = P (a1, . . . , ai|q1, . . . , qi)
and
R(a1, . . . , ai+1|q1, . . . , qi+1)
=
∑
ω
λ(ω)R1(a1, . . . , ai|q1, . . . , qi, ω)⊗R2(ai+1|qi+1, ω).
Here, (a) follows from Pinsker inequality, (b) follows from
the convexity of x 7→ x2, (c) follows from the convexity of
x 7→ |x|, and (d) follows from the following identity∑
a
(li+1)
i+1
( ∑
a
(1:l1−1)
1
· · ·
∑
a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
P˜
(
a
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . , a
(1:li+1−1)
i+1
∣∣q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1−1)i+1 )
P˜
(
a
(l1)
1, . . . , a
(li)
i
∣∣q(1:l1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li+1−1)i+1 , a(1:l1−1)1 , . . . , a(1:li+1−1)i+1 )
⊗ P˜
(
a
(li+1)
i+1
∣∣q(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,q(1:li−1)i ,q(1:li+1)i+1 , a(1:l1−1)1 , . . . , a(1:li+1−1)i+1 ))
= P
(
a
(l1)
1, . . . , a
(li)
i
∣∣q(l1)1 , . . . , q(li)i ).
Since the lower bound for conditional expectation is in-
dependent of Q
(1:l1−1)
1 = q
(1:l1−1)
1 , . . . ,Q
(1:li+1−1)
i+1 = q
(1:li+1−1)
i+1 , we
have
ki+1∑
li+1=1
· · ·
k1∑
l1=1
1
2
min
R∈LHV
[i:i+1]
P
∑
q1
· · ·
∑
qi+1
pi1(q1) . . . pii+1(qi+1)∥∥P (a1, . . . , ai+1∣∣q1, . . . , qi+1)−
R
(
a1, . . . , ai+1
∣∣q1, . . . , qi+1) ∥∥21
≤
ki+1∑
li+1=1
· · ·
k1∑
l1=1
I
(
A
(l1)
1 , . . . , A
(li)
i : A
(li+1)
i+1∣∣Q(1:l1)1 , . . . ,Q(1:li+1)i+1 ,A(1:l1−1)1 , . . . ,A(1:li+1−1)i+1 )
= I
(
A
(1:k1)
1 , . . . ,A
(1:ki)
i : A
(1:ki+1)
i+1
∣∣Q(1:k1)1 , . . . ,Q(1:ki+1)i+1 )
(a)
≤ ln |Ai+1|
ki+1 ,
where (a) follows from the fact that the mutual information is
upper bounded by H(A
(1:ki+1)
i+1 ) ≤ ln |Ai+1|
ki+1 .
Then, for any i = 1, . . . , N − 1, this gives the following
inequality:
min
R∈LHV
[i:i+1]
P
∑
q1
· · ·
∑
qi+1
pi1(q1) . . . pii+1(qi+1)∥∥P (a1, . . . , ai+1∣∣q1, . . . , qi+1)−
R
(
a1, . . . , ai+1
∣∣q1, . . . , qi+1) ∥∥1
≤
√
2 ln |Ai+1|
ki . . . k1
. (6)
For any i = 1, . . . , N − 1, let LHV
[i:i+1]
be the set of all
R ∈ P(A|Q) satisfying
R(a1, . . . , ai+1|q1, . . . , qi+1)
=
∑
ω
λ(ω)R1(a1, . . . , ai|q1, . . . , qi, ω)⊗R2(ai+1|qi+1, ω).
We define
ExtLHV :=
{
R ∈ LHV :
R(a1, . . . , aN |q1, . . . , qN ) =
N∏
i=1
Ri(ai|qi)
}
and
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
:=
{
R ∈ LHV
[i:i+1]
:
R(a1, . . . , ai+1|q1, . . . , qi+1) = R1(a1, . . . , ai|q1, . . . , qi)
⊗R2(ai+1|qi+1)
}
.
It is straightforward to prove that
ExtLHV =
N−1⋂
i=1
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
. (7)
For any j = 2, . . . , N , define the following pseudo-metric on
P(A|Q):
ρ
(1:j)
(P,R) :=
∑
q1
· · ·
∑
qj
pi1(q1) . . . pij(qj)∥∥P (a1, . . . , aj∣∣q1, . . . , qj)−R (a1, . . . , aj∣∣q1, . . . , qj) ∥∥1.
Note that
min
R∈LHV
∑
q
‖P ( · |q)−R( · |q)‖1 pi(q) = ρ
(1:N)
(P,LHV).
(8)
Using these definitions, we can find a upper bound for
ρ
(1:N)
(P,LHV) as follows:
ρ
(1:N)
(P,LHV)
(a)
= ρ
(1:N)
(P,ExtLHV)
(b)
= ρ
(1:N)
(
P,
N−1⋂
i=1
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
)
≤ ρ
(1:N)
(
P,LHV
[N−1:N ]
P
)
+ ρ
(1:N)
(
LHV
[N−1:N ]
P ,
N−1⋂
i=1
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
)
(c)
= ρ
(1:N)
(
P,LHV
[N−1:N ]
P
)
+ ρ
(1:N)
(
LHV
[N−1:N ]
P ,
N−2⋂
i=1
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
)
(d)
≤ ρ
(1:N)
(
P,LHV
[N−1:N ]
P
)
+ ρ
(1:N−1)
(
P,
N−2⋂
i=1
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
)
≤ ρ
(1:N)
(
P,LHV
[N−1:N ]
P
)
+ ρ
(1:N−1)
(
P,LHV
[N−2:N−1]
P
)
+ ρ
(1:N−1)
(
LHV
[N−2:N−1]
P ,
N−2⋂
i=1
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
)
≤ ρ
(1:N)
(
P,LHV
[N−1:N ]
P
)
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+ ρ
(1:N−1)
(
P,LHV
[N−2:N−1]
P
)
+ ρ
(1:N−2)
(
P,
N−3⋂
i=1
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
)
...
≤
N−1∑
i=1
ρ
(1:i+1)
(
P,LHV
[i:i+1]
P
)
(e)
≤
N−1∑
i=1
√
2 ln |Ai+1|
ki . . . k1
.
Here, (a) follows from convexity of ρ
(1:N)
(P, · ), (b) follows
from (7), (c) follows from
LHV
[N−1:N ]
P
⋂
ExtLHV
[N−1:N ]
6= ∅,
(d) follows from the following argument
ρ
(1:N)
(
LHV
[N−1:N ]
P ,
N−2⋂
i=1
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
)
= min
T∈LHV
[N−1:N ]
P
R∈
⋂N−2
i=1 Ext LHV
[i:i+1]
ρ
(1:N)
(T,R)
≤ min
T∈LHV
[N−1:N ]
P
R∈
⋂N−2
i=1 Ext LHV
[i:i+1]
ρ
(1:N−1)
(T,R)
= ρ
(1:N−1)
(
P,
N−2⋂
i=1
ExtLHV
[i:i+1]
)
,
and finally, (e) follows from (6). In view of (8), this completes
the proof.
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